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JUSTIFYING A SEARCH




The natural course for scholars is to make sense of things. One way of
enhancing understanding is to discover underlying principles or theories that
might be used to explain various otherwise unrelated ideas or occurrences. The
classification of an idea or occurrence within a broader category allows deduc-
tions or inferences about the quality of the notion or event.' Despite the pro-
gression of knowledge represented by such explanatory principles, unifying
theories have been increasingly attacked in many disciplines, including juris-
prudence, as modernistic devices whose validity is no longer unassailable. In a
postmodern world, unification is often seen as an attempt to escape from cer-
tain realities of the physical or the conceptual world. The world today, it
would seem, is not unified, but disjointed and complex.2
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., George Wash-
ington University, 1982; J.D., Catholic University of America Law School, 1985. I would like to
thank all of the participants in the Unconstitutional Conditions Symposium, and in particular Larry
Alexander, Tom Merrill and Fred Schauer, whose thoughts inspired this essay. I am grateful to the
following people who took the time to make comments on an earlier draft of the essay: David
Barnes, Arthur Best, Burton Brody, Alan Chen, Theresa Corrada, Nancy Ehrenreich, and Steve
Pepper. I owe a special debt of gratitude to the editors of the Denver University Law Review,
particularly Bart Johnson, who provided substantial research assistance, Lisa Banks, who worked
well beyond her term in completing the issue, and Sue Chrisman, for her technical expertise and
leadership. Any errors are sure to be discovered over time, leaving intact only the best ideas con-
tained herein.
1. In law, for example, Langdellian "conceptualism" served to usher in modem jurispru-
dence and was expressly anchored in "the powers of science and reason to uncover universal
truths." GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MoVEMENTs: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT
CENTURY'S END 13 (1995). There are a variety of reasons why unifying theories are generally
useful in law: they can provide a tool for deciding future cases, and for increasing predictability in
law; they may help society or the legislature understand the underlying significance of a series of
judicial decisions and thus expose those decisions to the controls of the political process; they may
aid in the development of other fields of law; also, understanding a unifying theory may increase
the legitimacy of a series of decisions, since it will protect them from the appearance of random-
ness or result-orientation.
2. See JEAN-FRANcoIs LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON
KNOWLEDGE (Geoff Bannington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984), cited in MINDA, supra note 1, at
14 n.11 (1995) ("I define postmodernism as incredulity toward metanarratives."); J.M. Balkin,
What Is a Postmodern Constitutionalism? 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1971-72 (1992) ("In philoso-
phy, postmodernism is an attack on what are called 'totalizing' theories or 'master narratives' that
seek to explain all or substantially all of society, history, knowledge, the nature of femininity, or
virtually anything else within a comprehensive and articulable theory.").
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In law, and especially in constitutional law, unifying principles, and im-
plicitly even merely the search for them, have been increasingly criticized as
futile and simplistic.3 The arguments of some of the scholars in this sympo-
sium resonate with this general criticism of modernist constitutional jurispru-
dence in arguing against a unified theory of unconstitutional conditions. What
Frederick Schauer has labeled "too hard,"'4 Larry Alexander has deemed "im-
possible."5 Although Thomas Merrill's contribution to this symposium has at-
tempted to unveil a possible unifying theory of the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, the contribution contains little discussion of the need or justifica-
tion for such a metanarrative.6 Thus, the need to make a comment on, if not
to fully explain, the validity of a search for a metatheory of unconstitutional
conditions has arisen.
To be sure, neither Alexander nor Schauer positions his criticism of a
metadoctrine of unconstitutional conditions within the broader canvas of mo-
dernity and postmodemism. Alexander does not expressly draw any compari-
sons between law and science in arguing against a metatheory of unconsti-
tutional conditions. Neither are Alexander and Schauer as monolithic about
metanarratives in constitutional law as their contributions to this symposium
might suggest, having expressly left open the idea of uniformity in other parts
of constitutional jurisprudence.7 It is only with a metatheory of unconstitution-
al conditions that they care to quibble. It is precisely that neither scholar has
chosen to explore the greater implications of his methodology and because
each seems to have made some implicit (and in Schauer's case, explicit) as-
sumptions about the differences between science and law that a commentary
about their collective skepticism toward a metatheory of unconstitutional con-
ditions is warranted.
This essay explores why many scholars, including Schauer and Alexander,
feel that an attempt at unification of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
is unworthy of scholarly attention. Although the subject of this particular essay
is less ambitious than the many attempts that have been made to unify the
3. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION
24-30 (1991) (attacking the search for unifying principles in constitutional law as demonstrative of
the interpretive fallacy known as "hyper-integration"); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and
the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1334 (1988) (collecting authority on the movement
away from grand theories in constitutional law).
4. See Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of Con-
stitutional Consistency, 72 DENY. U. L. REV. 989 (1995).
5. See Larry Alexander, Impossible, 72 DENY. U. L. REv. 1007 (1995) [hereinafter Alexan-
der, Impossible]. A more complete picture of Larry Alexander's reasons for deeming hopeless a
search for a unifying principle of unconstitutional conditions can be found in Larry Alexander,
Constitutional Theory and Constitutionally Optional Benefits and Burdens, 11 CONST. COMMEN-
TARY 287 (1994) [hereinafter Alexander, Benefits and Burdens]; Larry Alexander, Understanding
Constitutional Rights in a World of Optional Baselines. 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 175 (1989) [here-
inafter Alexander, Optional Baselines].
6. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as
Public Goods, 72 DENy. U. L. REV. 859 (1995).
7. See Alexander, Impossible, supra note 5, at 1007 (explaining that theoretical accounts are
only impossible in "certain doctrinal areas"); Schauer, supra note 4, at 990 n.3 ("I do not claim
that all or even most constitutional problems are doctrinally insoluble. I claim merely that some




doctrine of uncons.titutional conditions, and indeed proposes no unifying theory
itself, it nevertheless examines why attempts to explain the doctrine in a uni-
fied way might be valid even if no unification is ultimately possible. It also at-
tempts to persuade that a unifying theory of the doctrine may be attainable,
although such a doctrine is yet to be articulated. The essay seeks to justify the
search for metatheories and to diminish skepticism about them by revealing
some strengths of modem conceptualist thinking while at the same time em-
bracing some of the ideas of postmodemism.8
II. JUSTIFYING A SEARCH FOR A UNIFYING THEORY OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONDITIONS
A. Unifying Theories as Beneficial: The Lessons of Science
The search for unifying principles in law is undoubtedly a difficult en-
deavor, but law has no monopoly on the difficulty of such an enterprise. The
history of science, and in particular physics, has well demonstrated the great
struggle represented by attempts at unification.9 One of the primary reasons
for the difficulty is the indeterminacy of many answers to questions that re-
quire resolution prior to uncovering metatheories that can explain all or even
substantially all outcomes in a particular area. In constitutional law, the piece-
meal quality and the long history of constitutional interpretation make the
search for a metatheory seem arrogant or even laughable.' ° Nevertheless, de-
spite similar uncertainties in the field of science, the search for unifying prin-
ciples there has proven useful."
Physics serves as a good example of why the search for unification, even
in an area as seemingly unpromising as unconstitutional conditions, can be
meaningful. 2 One might start with Isaac Newton, who radically changed the
8. My approach more or less fits the view of J.M. Balkin, who has concluded: "I prefer to
see postmodernism as a particular continuation of the Enlightenment, and a reevaluation of what
was good and bad about the Enlightenment project." Balkin, supra note 2, at 1988. Obviously, de-
spite my disclaimer above, the subject of this essay is fairly ambitious. While it attempts to make
a point about the scholarly enterprise in law, it is important to acknowledge that the length of the
essay forces some reductionism and generality. These should not serve, however, to diminish the
overall message.
9. For two more recent descriptions of attempts at unification in science, see JAMES
GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE (1987); STEPHEN W. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF
TIME: FROM THE BIG BANG TO BLACK HOLES (1988).
10. Laurence Tribe and Michael Doff have called the notion of a singular vision of the Con-
stitution "an extraordinary intellectual conceit," one at odds with the "character of the
Constitution's various provisions as concrete political enactments that represent historically contin-
gent, and not always wholly coherent, compromises in a document that was made in stages,
incrementally, over a period of two centuries." TRIBE & DORF, supra note 3, at 24.
11. See HAWKING, supra note 9, at 13.
12. I borrow from and have been influenced in this discussion by Laurence H. Tribe, The
Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1989), even though I am using references to Tribe's text in a way that is completely
opposite of what he intended. Tribe does not hold with metatheoretical approaches to constitution-
al law in general and the analogy in his article is an analogy to the substance of the general theory
of relativity which teaches that the physical world is not as mechanical or simplistic as Newton's
discoveries would suggest. Tribe concludes that the state influences its subjects and is in turn
influenced by its subjects in much the same way that the general theory tells us that everything in
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world of science in the late 1600s when he explained his construction of "the
first modem synthesis of the physical world'" One of Newton's primary
contributions involved his explanation of the law of gravity, suggesting that
gravity was a much larger force in the physical world than previously be-
lieved. As great a contribution as Newton made, however, it turned out that
his explanations were merely partial ones, something even Newton apparently
acknowledged. 4
Indeed, a good deal of physics in the second half of the nineteenth centu-
ry was devoted to attacking Newton's mechanical view of the universe. Scien-
tists like James Maxwell, Gustav Kirchoff, Ernst Mach, and others chipped
away at Newtonian notions of absolute space and time. It is extremely unlikely
that the Ernst Machs and the James Maxwells of the scientific world decried
attempts at a unifying theory as "impossible" or "too hard." And while it is
true that they may not have believed it too hard or impossible to sum up the
universe in one equation, it is doubtful that they would have spent a great deal
of energy debunking attempts at a metatheory if they had. Although these sci-
entists of the late nineteenth century criticized Newton's synthesis and did not
substitute their own syntheses in place of his, they served as stepping stones
for a later scientist, Albert Einstein, who would.
The point has been made that science and law are insufficiently related to
draw any meaning from their comparison. 5 The prevailing wisdom seems to
be that science is undergirded by certain physical principles or constants that
make unifying principles in science discoverable and useful. 6 Law, on the
the physical world acts upon and is acted upon by its surroundings. Although Tribe's point is, of
course, a good one, it is ironic that such an insight is drawn from a theory that is the product of a
search for unification. As Stephen Hawking explains, "the search for the ultimate theory of the
universe seems difficult to justify on practical grounds. (It is worth noting, though, that similar
arguments could have been used against both relativity and quantum mechanics, and these theories
have given us both nuclear energy and the microelectronics revolution!)." HAWKING, supra note 9,
at 13.
13. RONALD W. CLARK, EINsTEIN: TiE LiFE AND TIMES 74 (1971).
14. Laurence Tribe relates that Einstein did not hold with Newton's idea that "space" was
uniquely different from other physical elements. See Tribe, supra note 12, at 7. Einstein himself
wrote that the idea that "space" is somehow uninfluenced by other elements is unsatisfactory, and
that "Newton had been fully aware of this deficiency, but he had also clearly understood that no
other path was open to physics in his time." ALBERT EINSTEIN, THE MEANING OF RELATIVITY 140
(5th ed. 1956).
15. See, e.g., TRIBE & DORF, supra note 3, at 87-96 (subchapter entitled "How Law is Un-
like Mathematics").
16. Comparing the struggle for constitutional understanding to scientific discovery, Schauer
notes that
[u]nder what appears to be a common view of constitutional ontology, the correct solu-
tions to constitutional problems are like scientific observations. Just as scientific obser-
vations are always explainable in theory, even if we have yet to discover that explana-
tion, so too, according to a common view, are all correct constitutional outcomes in
theory explainable by a constitutional doctrine that will generate them. Under this view,
the development of constitutional doctrines and theories is ultimately a task of discovery.
Yet perhaps that is not so. Perhaps some constitutional problems are irredeemably
intractable, and are so precisely because they replicate the deepest, hardest, and therefore
least solvable problems of constitutional government. And perhaps some constitutional
problems appear intractable because we are looking for coherent principles and usable
doctrines in areas of policy, where questions of degree predominate, and where seem-
ingly arbitrary lines are necessary to settle temporarily, but not to resolve in any deeper
1014 [Vol. 72:4
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other hand, is subject to the quirks and eccentricities of human emotion, irra-
tionality, and misperception, and therefore cannot possibly develop along the
same uniform and consistent lines used to describe physical events. 7 Science,
however, is not as certain or uniform as the prevailing wisdom would suggest.
As in constitutional law, the modernist notion that unifying principles
abound in science has also been attacked as insufficiently explanatory. The
argument is, fundamentally, that scientific knowledge and advances in physics
can better be explained as resulting from "paradigms" or "models" that togeth-
er make up a scientific work ethic of sorts rather than as resulting from some
existing common thread of physical principles that merely need be uncov-
ered. 8 Nevertheless, unifying theories that explain physical events have been
promulgated and celebrated in science, and the search for greater unification
continues."
There are, however, three ways in which science resembles law that have
implications for the pursuit of a unifying theory of unconstitutional conditions.
First, the definition of a useful theory in both science and law is roughly the
same, making arguments about theory in both fields similar. Second, science is
gripped by indeterminacy and uncertainty in this century (quantum mechanics
and chaos theory) that resembles the quagmire of constitutional law described
by both Schauer and Alexander. And yet despite these difficulties, unifying
theories are still sought in science and partial theories have proved useful.
Finally, there is much in science, like law, that is simply intuitive, and one of
science's grand theories for explaining the state of the universe rests precisely
on the existence and nature of human beings within it. Such a theory may
suggest that human reasoning might follow certain patterns that simply need to
be discovered. These three similarities are discussed more extensively in the
following sections.
sense, intrinsically competing policy objectives.
Schauer, supra note 4, at 989-90 (emphasis added).
17. See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977). Gilmore explained:
Man's fate will forever elude the attempts of his intellect to understand it. The acciden-
tal variables which hedge us about effectively screen the future from our view. The
quest for the laws which will explain the riddle of human behavior leads us not toward
truth but toward the illusion of certainty, which is our curse.
Id. at 100. Larry Alexander notes:
There is another reason why the unconstitutional conditions metadoctrine is such a
mess.... The Constitution has increasingly come to be viewed, not as a list of fixed,
determinate rules, but as a source of heavily moralized "principles." The various terms
that our constitutional vocabulary employs---"legitimacy" and "compellingness" of state
interest for example-invoke morality.
Alexander, Impossible, supra note 5, at 1010; see also Schauer, supra note 4, at 989-90.
18. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 3, at 1335-36 n.24 (quoting THoMAS S. KUHN, THE STRuc-
TURE OF SCNTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962)).
19. Stephen Hawking comments that
[u]itimately, however, one would hope to find a complete, consistent, unified theory that
would include all these partial theories as approximations and that did not need to be
adjusted to fit the facts by picking the values of certain arbitrary numbers in the theory.
The quest for such a theory is known as "the unification of physics."...
As I shall describe, the prospects for finding such a theory seem to be much
better now because we know so much more about the universe.
HAWKING, supra note 9, at 155-56.
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1. The Definition of Theory
Perhaps the best way to begin thinking about the ways in which law and
science are related is definitionally. How, for example, would we know a
"unifying principle" if one were posited? And, what would be particularly
useful about it? In science, a "unifying principle" or "theory" is good or useful
if it meets two requirements: "It must accurately describe a large class of
observations on the basis of a model that contains only a few arbitrary ele-
ments, and it must make definite predictions about the results of future obser-
vations."'2 A useful theory cannot be merely descriptive, it must also be pre-
dictive.2  ewton's theory of gravity is a good one, then, because it is de-
scriptive in that it tells us something about the relationship between physical
bodies, and, moreover, it predicts the motions of the planets to a high degree
of accuracy.22
A jurisprudential definition of "unifying principle" or theory would be the
same: descriptive and predictive. The problem so many commentators and
judges encounter with the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is not one of
description, but one of prediction.23 Most commentators and judges, for ex-
ample, are able to identify when a problem of unconstitutional conditions
might arise-any instance in which the government conditions the granting of
a benefit on the surrender of a constitutional right. The rub comes in predict-
ing when such a condition will be struck down as unconstitutional, since not
every instance that implicates the doctrine yields a decision finding the
government's action unconstitutional.
Thomas Merrill's article in this symposium is a good example of how a
unifying principle in law might be approached. Merrill begins by explaining
the weaknesses of other attempts at metatheories of unconstitutional condi-
tions. He explains the weakness of unifying attempts based on coercion,24
government monopoly power,' and the importance of the right to individuals
who choose to waive it.26 The method by which Merrill shows weakness is
by describing important outcomes that are not predicted by the posited unify-
ing notion. Thus, a coercion theory is not predictive because allowing uncon-
stitutional conditions to attach to benefits creates a more optimal, and thus
noncoercive, set of circumstances for individuals than those they would be
confronted with if rights were inalienable. 7 The monopoly theory of uncon-
20. See id. at 9. Albert Einstein felt similarly that, "[a] theory ... is the more impressive the
greater the simplicity of its premises is, the more different kinds of things it relates, and the more
extended is its area of applicability." CLARK, supra note 13, at 109.
21. According to Stephen Hawking, Aristotle's theory that everything is made out of four
elements-earth, air, fire, and water-is not a good or useful theory because it fails to make any
definite predictions about future outcomes. HAWKING, supra note 9, at 9.
22. Id. at 9-10.
23. And it is the predictive problem that motivates both Alexander and Schauer in their
criticism of a unifying theory of unconstitutional conditions. See infra text accompanying notes
42-45.
24. See Merrill, supra note 6, at 859-60.
25. Id. at 860.
26. Id. at 860-61.
27. Id. at 859-60.
1016 [Vol. 72:4
JUSTIFYING A SEARCH
stitutional conditions is not predictive because it does not account for cases
striking down unconstitutional conditions attached to nonmonopolistic govern-
ment employment.2 The theory seeking to explain the doctrine based on the
importance of the individual right at stake is not sufficiently predictive be-
cause the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been applied more robust-
ly to certain First Amendments rights and separation of powers controversies
than it has been applied to arguably more individually important reproductive
or criminal procedural rights.29 Moreover, according to Merrill, none of the
above attempts at unification can state why on occasion the cases applying the
doctrine have required a nexus between the right being waived and some
governmental interest arising from the benefits program under scrutiny.0 To
Merrill, implicitly, the proposed theories are insufficiently predictive if they
cannot account for the cases involving a nexus requirement.
Into the gap, as it were, Merrill inserts his own unifying theory. He pro-
poses that we might view constitutional rights from a public goods perspective
in analyzing the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. According to Merrill,
exercises of certain constitutional rights produce external benefits which serve
to advantage third parties.3 Merrill shows how a ranking of these rights ac-
cording to the force of their external benefits better predicts the outcomes of
court decisions involving the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
To Merrill, the public goods approach is better than many other past ap-
proaches to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions because it can explain
outcomes across a broad range of constitutional doctrines and therefore has
superior predictive capacity. Merrill begins by showing how free speech and
separation of powers, while having private benefits, also redound to the benefit
of the public. Citing to Daniel Farber, Merrill explains the public goods aspect
of information release and through it explains government subsidization of
speech.32 Merrill also explains how separation of powers serves our system of
checks and balances in a public sense, which, in turn, explains why waivers of
these constitutional limits cannot be made by the individual beneficiaries of
them.33
By way of contrast, Merrill explains the lack of external benefits associat-
ed with rights raised as a defense to criminal prosecution. The desire to avoid
criminal prosecution will ensure an adequate supply of both public and private
benefits flowing from the right. However, Merrill distinguishes the contextual
exercise of the right from the situation that arises when government seeks to
purchase a waiver of the right in advance.34 Merrill proceeds to show how a
public goods approach to constitutional rights predicts outcomes in a wide-
ranging array of areas of constitutional concern. He tracks the theory by apply-
28. Id. at 860.
29. Id. at 860-61.
30. Id. at 861.
31. Id. at 870.
32. Id. (citing Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First
Amendment, 105 HARv. L. REV. 554 (1991)).
33. Merrill, supra note 6, at 871.
34. Id.
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ing it to the right to vote,35 separation of powers, 6 abortion funding," and
the law of jurisdiction.3" Merrill uses the public goods lens to explain the
application of a nexus requirement in certain unconstitutional conditions cas-
es,39 and he suggests how the public goods approach may be more successful
than other theories in explaining the distinction between "penalties" and
"subsidies."' Finally, Merrill applies his public goods analysis to the Takings
Clause in an attempt to explain the Court's result in Dolan v. City of
Tigard.
41
Just as Merrill critiques earlier unifying attempts, both Schauer and Alex-
ander seek to discredit any possibility of a unifying theory of unconstitutional
conditions by arguing that some doctrinal areas in constitutional jurisprudence
are so chaotic that no single idea could explain case outcomes completely
enough to predict future outcomes. Alexander discusses, for example, "bene-
fits" and "burdens" in analyzing the Supreme Court's Dormant Commerce
Clause cases, which emphasize distinctions between discriminatory taxes and
discriminatory subsidies.42 To Alexander, there is no meaningful way to sepa-
rate taxes from subsidies under the framework established by the Supreme
Court for Dormant Commerce Clause cases. Accordingly, any attempt to de-
velop a unifying theory of unconstitutional conditions will fail because there is
effectively no way to bring the indeterminacy of Dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence into the fold. The upshot is that Alexander believes no unifying
theory is possible because the randomness of Dormant Commerce Clause
interpretation makes any predictability impossible.
Schauer, likewise, begins by assuming the legitimacy of status quo doc-
trine in starting with the premise that the government cannot fund all art'
and that the state as employer should not necessarily have to put up with
criticism by its employees." And, yet, intuitively these actions or omissions
by government seem to violate at least one strongly accepted view of the First
Amendment, and certainly would violate any cohesive doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions that would strive to incorporate within it the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause. As a result, Schauer concludes, there can
be no unifying theory of unconstitutional conditions because the "embedded
exclusions" that exist now in First Amendment free speech doctrine will en-
sure the existence of unity-destroying exceptions.45 To Schauer, since any
unifying principle would be burdened by various exceptions that must swallow
it, any predictive quality of a unifying theory would be too diluted to be use-
ful.
35. Id. at 873-74.
36. Id. at 874.
37. Id. at 875.
38. Id. at 875-76.
39. Id. at 876-77.
40. Id. at 878.
41. Id. at 880-87 (discussing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994)).
42. Alexander, Impossible, supra note 5, at 1007-08.
43. Schauer, supra note 4, at 994.
44. Id. at 1002-03.
45. Id. at 1002.
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Thus, Merrill, Alexander, and Schauer all test the quality of theories, or
potential theories, about the doctrine by saying something about their predic-
tive nature. They argue for or against unification of the doctrine either posi-
tively by highlighting the predictive power of a unifying idea (in the case of
Merrill) or negatively by showing how no single idea can possibly predict cer-
tain outcomes, making any theory of unconstitutional conditions useless (as in
the case of Schauer and Alexander). All three commentators use the very
rationalistic and Enlightenment-produced construct of a good theory, which
they all implicitly believe is only useful if predictive. Thus, science and law
are strongly related in a definitional sense. Indeed, if theories are to be judged
by the same criteria in science and law, the two are certainly much more
similar than they at first appear.
2. The Randomness of Science
Despite Schauer's characterization of science as a task of discovery, "al-
ways explainable in theory even if we have yet to discover [the] explanation,"
science, like law, is beset by uncertainties and irregularities-some so discon-
tinuous and erratic as to be called "monstrosities" rather than scientific puz-
zles.' Two of these areas of uncertainty in science have implications for a
unifying theory of unconstitutional conditions. They are quantum theory (par-
ticularly the principle of uncertainty) and chaos theory.
Quantum theory is characterized by uncertainty. The theory was intro-
duced in 1900 by Max Planck who suggested that light and other waves were
emitted in packets called quanta. This theory of energy emission accurately
described observations of radiation emission from stars.47 Using Planck's
theory of quanta, Werner Heisenberg, in 1926, formulated his now famous
principle of uncertainty. According to Heisenberg, the only way to determine
the future position of a particle (like an electron) is to measure its present
position and speed by shining light on it and observing how light is scattered
by the particle. Planck's theory of quanta created a problem for Heisenberg.
Since light is emitted in packets, one cannot use less than one quantum of
light to measure the position and speed of a particle. But a quantum of light is
substantial relative to the particle, meaning that the light will have an effect on
the particle. Thus, the quantum of light used to measure the particle will also
change the particle's velocity in a way that cannot be predicted.' Moreover,
the more one desires to measure the exact position of a particle, the more light
one will be required to emit. But more light has a greater unpredictable effect
on the speed of the particle. "In other words, the more accurately you try to
measure the position of the particle, the less accurately you can measure its
speed, and vice versa."'49
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle presented a substantial barrier to any
unifying theory of physics. While Einstein's theory of relativity unified large
46. See GLEICK, supra note 9, at 3.
47. See HAWKING, supra note 9, at 54.
48. Id. at 54-55.
49. Id. at 55.
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scale physics, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle strongly argues against a
deterministic model of the universe since an exact measurement of the present
state of the universe can never be undertaken. It is interesting to note that a
physicist thinking like Alexander or Schauer might have thrown up his hands
in light of Heisenberg's discovery and maintained that the uncertainty principle
confirms that no unification of all physics is possible. Heisenberg may well
have taken this approach.
Instead, Heisenberg and other physicists in the 1920s created a new phys-
ics called quantum mechanics. These physicists worked with what they knew
about the effects of quanta on particles. Thus, quantum mechanics does not
predict a single definite result for an observation.' Rather, the theory predicts
a number of different possible results and tells how likely each of these is."'
Quantum mechanics introduced unpredictability and randomness into science.
Despite its uncertainty, quantum mechanics currently underlies nearly all of
modem science and technology. 2 According to Hawking, a combination of
general relativity and quantum mechanics raises a new possibility not recog-
nized before: "that space and time together might form a finite, four-dimen-
sional space without singularities or boundaries, like the surface of the earth
but with more dimensions."53 Such a principle could serve to explain much of
the universe, including the existence of human beings.54
Another theoretical framework, chaos theory, has been used by scientists
in the latter half of this century to explain the occurrence of events so chaotic
that they had long been relegated to the scientific dustbin of problems "impos-
sible" to crack. Chaos theory explores the nature of systems, particularly dy-
namic systems like the weather or waterfalls. One cannot, for example, predict
where two bits of foam floating at the top of a waterfall will wind up at the
bottom because the waterfall is subject to so many irregularities that any pre-
diction of an outcome should be "impossible. 55
The seeming impossibility of predicting outcomes from chaotic systems
may resemble the impossibility of deriving an explanatory principle that ties
together the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Many scientists, in a man-
ner similar to that of Schauer and Alexander, abandoned their efforts to under-
stand and predict the results of chaotic systems.56 And yet, in the 1960s sci-
entists began to understand that "simple mathematical equations could model
systems every bit as violent as a waterfall."57 Scientists began to see that wild
differences in output could be attributed to minute differences in input. Indeed,
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 56 ("[Quantum mechanics] governs the behavior of transistors and integrated cir-
cuits, which are the essential components of electronic devices such as televisions and computers,
and is also the basis of modem chemistry and biology.").
53. Id. at 173.
54. Id. at 173-74.
55. GLEICK, supra note 9, at 4.
56. Id. at 3.
57. Id. at 8.
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"a butterfly stirring the air today in Peking can transform storm systems next
month in New York."58
The ideas developed by chaos theorists were met with incomprehension,
resistance, and anger by the scientific community. And who could blame that
community. Chaos theory says that "[slimple systems give rise to complex
behavior. Complex systems give rise to simple behavior. And most important,
the laws of complexity hold universally, caring not at all for the details of a
system's constituent atoms."59 The predictions of chaos theorists that com-
plexity operates in uniform ways have connected systems that were previously
thought entirely unrelated: chaos theory has allowed physiologists to find order
in the chaos that develops in the human heart causing unexplained death;
chaos theory has aided ecologists in understanding the unexplained rise and
fall of gypsy moth populations; chaos theory has led economists to new kinds
of analyses about stock prices.6' Chaos theory suggests that science, like law,
has its areas of unpredictability that might become explainable despite seem-
ingly large odds against it.
Chaos theory has been applied to law by at least one commentator.6'
Robert Scott makes the point that case outcomes in law resemble the complex
systems that lie at the heart of chaos theory. 62 Even slight differences in the
facts of a case can result in wildly disparate judicial outcomes. 63 This obser-
vation has led many legal scholars, particularly adherents of the Critical Legal
Studies movement, to conclude that the search for a just legal order is futile:
chaos is inevitable.' Scott reminds us that the lessons of chaos theory are not
that intuitive or simplistic; chaos theorists have concluded that chaotic process-
es are more stable than those in equilibrium, and that deep patterns are imbed-
ded in all chaotic processes.65 If Scott is correct, recurring patterns may be
found in unpredictable and irregular human behavior, even in legal systems
and legal decisions. Thus, complexity should not deter legal scholars from
seeking patterns in judicial outcomes despite the irregularity and unpredictabil-
ity of the justifications used by judges in reasoning toward a particular end
result.
3. Science and Law as Functions of Human Behavior: The Anthropic
Principle and Intuitionism
Comparing human reasoning and intuition to the natural phenomena mod-
elled in physics or in mathematics at first blush seems foolish. The capricious-
58. Id. The "Butterfly Effect," as it is known, has become symbolic of chaos theory.
59. Id. at 304.
60. Id. at 3-4.
61. See Robert E. Scott, Chaos Theory and the Justice Paradox, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
329 (1993).
62. Id. at 348.
63. id.
64. Although Robert Scott singles out the "crits" for their anti-foundationalist tendencies, it
seems obvious that the questioning of master narratives is not exclusively their domain. See TRIBE
& DORF, supra note 3; Alexander, Impossible, supra note 5; Farber, supra note 3; Schauer, supra
note 4.
65. Scott, supra note 61, at 349.
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ness and whimsy of human judgments seem far removed from the more order-
ly and predictable physical world. And yet one might ask whether the process-
es that lead to physical events are really that removed from the processes that
yield results in disputes that are decided in courts of law. A complex set of
physical events after all-the working of the human mind-produces the judi-
cial outcomes that we wish to draw together by a single principle.
Scientists have thought about the connections between human
existence-even human thought-and the state of our universe. The "anthropic
principle" in metaphysics posits that the reason the universe is the way it is
has something to do with the fact that we (humans) are here to see it.' A
different way to state the idea, and one more useful for our purposes, is that
unifying theories describing physical events are discoverable because those
events are related in some way to the mind that seeks their explanation. Hawk-
ing strongly implies exactly this kind of determinism when he explains,
[tihe laws of science, as we know them at present, contain many fun-
damental numbers, like the size of the electric charge of the electron
and the ratio of the masses of the proton and the electron. We cannot,
at the moment at least, predict the values of these numbers from
theory-we have to find them by observation. It may be that one day
we shall discover a complete unified theory that predicts them
all.... The remarkable fact is that the values of these numbers seem
to have been very finely adjusted to make possible the development of
life.67
If in fact the universe has been fine-tuned to support life and if that life
can evolve in such a way as to allow it ultimately to discover this, then there
may be a unified explanatory principle to draw it all together. The analogy of
anthropism to law may be found in Hawking's explanation of why human
beings could come to discover a unifying principle of the universe. According
to Hawking, Darwin's principle of natural selection says that in any population
of self-reproducing organisms, the differences in the genetic material and
upbringing that different individuals have "will mean that some individuals are
better able than others to draw the right conclusions about the world around
them and to act accordingly." These individuals will ultimately survive and
their pattern of behavior will dominate.' We might ultimately expect that
reasoning abilities honed by natural selection would lead us to a unified theory
of physics, and not to the wrong conclusions."
Applied to decisional law, the argument would be similar. Natural selec-
tion has possibly led to Supreme Court decisions that tend to develop towards
an explainable or predictable pattern. Likewise, the state of our law has
evolved by virtue of the increasingly superior minds that have fashioned it. If
the law has evolved in a regular way, then unifying principles that explain it
66. See HAWKING, supra note 9, at 124.
67. Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 12.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 13.
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should be discoverable. I understand the many problems with this
nonfalseifiable argument, not the least of which would be the existence of
dissenting opinions." But let's assume the notion is only roughly true. If so,
there would be sufficient rationality across all outcomes of cases to allow
some strong unifications.
Perhaps the parallel to the anthropic principle is not a sufficient argument
to convince most that the human mind would over time and subconsciously
produce case outcomes later capable of unification. Consider, however, what
Albert Einstein wrote about the merger of rationality and intuition. In 1918,
Einstein published an essay entitled, Principles of Research.72 In it he meta-
phorically described the origin of scientific method and expounded upon the
ultimate ability of human reasoning to find the grand elemental laws. 3 He
noted the direct correlation between the theories devised by the human mind
and the order that is found in nature.74 According to Einstein, the explanation
for this is that our minds are guided by "preestablished harmony."7 Gerald
Holton, writing about Einstein's essay, concludes that "the synthesis of ratio-
nality and intuition-rather than their opposition-is the key to answering all
questions of science, as we now understand the term."7 6 Holton seems to
mean that true understanding will not be achieved until we can couple what is
rational-physics and mathematics, for example-with what is
intuitional-like the mystical or spiritual. Holton's jolting conclusion suggests
that the ultimate coupling of rationality and intuition may have implications
beyond science. If so, science and law may not, indeed, be the polar opposites
some would suggest. For example, law currently is a microcosm of Holton's
suggestion-it is characterized by the rational as well as the intuitionistic.
Some parts of constitutional law, for example, can be explained by underlying
principles while other parts are unexplainable and seem to change on a case
by case basis.
By comparing law to science, I hope to have revealed that science, like
law, is not entirely an orderly system made up of known or discoverable rules.
Science is beset by unpredictability and irregularity just like law despite the
fact that some parts of both science and law are ordered and contain rules that
lead to a high degree of predictability. Yet, whereas in science the unpredict-
71. An argument could be posited that dissenting opinions are opinions that did not prevail,
and are therefore weaker. The argument is hard to make since there are a great deal of very well
reasoned opinions. Another approach to dissenting opinions might be that the reasoning process
that would yield a superior decision tends to break down once a Court majority has formed around
a particular result since only a majority is required to establish law. If unanimity were required the
end result of the Court opinion would be the same under a notion of darwinistic reasoning or
intuitionism, but the reasons underpinning the decision might be more enduring or at least might
more closely explain the result.
72. See Gerald Holton, The Controversy over the End of Science, SCmNTIFIC AMERICAN,
Oct. 1995, at 191. Holton is the Mallinckrodt Professor of Physics and Professor of History of
Science at Harvard University.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. Holton ascribes the notion of preestablished harmony to Leibniz, who held "that God
allows productive resonance between the material and spiritual realms." Id.
76. Id.
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ability of the velocity of particles or the irregular nature of weather patterns
has not deterred the search for unification of physics or the search for univer-
sal principles of complexity, in law the seeming indeterminacy of some doc-
nines in constitutional jurisprudence has indeed served to stymie the search for
metatheories. The next section explores why irregularity may have scared
scholars away from the search for unifying principles and why that ultimately
may have detrimental implications for the law's continued development.
B. Do Science and Law Resemble Each Other?: Addressing Skepticism
Towards a Unifying Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions
My analogy of science and law might be criticized by skeptics as unrealis-
tic, naive, or worse, inapt. I will address any possible critiques in the context
of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions by focussing on Schauer's and
Alexander's criticisms of a metadoctrine of unconstitutional conditions in this
symposium."
As a general matter, the two positions arguing against the possibility of a
unifying theory of unconstitutional conditions share two common traits. The
first of these is that they both use particular constitutional cases to make their
point.78 I do not disagree with the authors' descriptions of the various cases
they choose to highlight. I agree that each case is complex and that some of
these cases, either alone or in combination with other cases resolving similar
issues, pose a seemingly intractable problem for a unifying theory of unconsti-
tutional conditions.
It is the second common trait of each of these articles with which I take
issue. Both authors assume that the Supreme Court's reasoning in each case
must somehow control the metatheoretical inquiry. I know of no reason why
this should be so. Both Schauer and Alexander articulate their arguments about
the indeterminacy of First Amendment or Commerce Clause cases by relying
on the rationales, rather than the outcomes, of the Court in those cases. To
illustrate the fallacy of this approach with respect to the possibility of fashion-
ing a unified theory of unconstitutional conditions, let me analogize again, but
briefly, to physics. When Newton proposed his law of gravity, there was little
question that it was a good theory because it served to predict the positions of
the planets to a high degree of accuracy.79 His theory, however, also made
certain predictions about the speed of gravity. According to Newton, gravita-
tional effects should travel with infinite velocity."0
Obviously, Albert Einstein was well aware of Newton's theory of gravity
and about the orbit of planets. Einstein's theories of relativity, interestingly,
made the same accurate predictions about the orbits of planets as did
77. See Alexander, Impossible, supra note 5; Schauer, supra note 4.
78. Schauer primarily relies on Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); and Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563 (1968). Alexander primarily focuses his attention on Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 468
U.S. 263 (1984); and West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994).
79. See HAWKING, supra note 9, at 17.
80. Id. at 29.
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Newton's law; however, in at least one case--the orbit of Mercury-Einstein's
theories were more predictive than Newton's." What was astounding about
this was that Einstein's theories conceived of gravity in a radically different
way than Newton's law. Einstein's special theory of relativity, for example,
predicted that nothing can travel faster than light, a notion inconsistent with
the Newtonian theory of gravity.82 To explain this, Einstein devised his gen-
eral theory of relativity, which departed extensively from Newtonian principles
in suggesting that "gravity is not a force like other forces, but is a conse-
quence of the fact that space-time is not flat, as had been previously assumed:
it is curved, or "warped," by the distribution of mass and energy in it." 3 Ein-
stein did not build on Newton's law so much as he created a new idea of
gravity. Had Einstein been intent on proceeding from Newton's reasoning,
rather than focusing independently on the outcomes of the physical events
Newton was seeking to describe, we may well not have Einstein's theories of
relativity today.
Schauer maintains that First Amendment doctrine has been characterized
by a historical development that has taken the doctrine from one that tolerated
no law abridging speech to one characterized by so many "embedded exclu-
sions" that a singular theory of the clause is hard to imagine. 4 He argues
further that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, as applied in First Amend-
ment cases, has followed a similar path." Schauer's view of the case law cer-
tainly suggests that his conclusions are correct. But is Schauer focusing on the
right things, and is he asking the proper questions? First, by focusing on the
rationales of the decisions he highlights, rather than the outcomes, Schauer
necessarily must conclude that the decisions are so irreconcilable as to strong-
ly suggest no unification is possible. Second, as chaotic as the decisions seem,
Schauer is able, by focusing on results, to make some very definite points
about them as a group. If these cases may be linked by any common notion,
then as disparate as they may seem, chaos theory suggests deep patterns may
be found.
With respect to the former observation-that Schauer's focus on rationale
necessarily leads to the conclusions he reaches-one way in which Schauer
seeks to maintain that no unification is possible for the theory of unconstitu-
tional conditions is by showing that the case law within any given constitu-
tional law doctrine is incapable of being harmonized. Thus, under the Dormant
Commerce Clause, even though it can generally be said that "state prohibitions
on non-state commercial activity that are designed to increase one state's
competitive advantage over another state's violate the Constitution,"86 the
Dormant Commerce Clause has been read by the Court not to apply in some
circumstances when an analysis of economic effects argues that it should have
81. Id. at 10.
82. Id. at 28-29.
83. Id. at 29.
84. Schauer, supra note 4, at 1004.
85. Id. at 991-92.
86. Schauer, supra note 4, at 996.
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been applied.17 Likewise under the First Amendment, decisions that seek to
produce robust and wide open debate on matters of public concem-the touch-
stone of free speech cases like Sullivan and Pickering-often do the oppo-
site."8 Similarly, the state action doctrine serves independently to limit pure
application of a theory of unconstitutional conditions because of the Court's
view that the Constitution was not intended to protect positive rights, meaning
that direct and indirect prohibitions cannot be viewed in the same way. 9
Arguing against the notion of unification, Schauer takes the Court's deci-
sions at face value. Thus, the Dormant Commerce Clause inhibits "protection-
ism," the free speech cases encourage "robust and wide open debate," and the
Constitution only protects "negative rights." By accepting these statements
about the thrust of the various constitutional provisions it becomes quite a
simple exercise to show that the Court does not in every instance live up to
these ideals. But is it possible that other notions or philosophies truly underpin
some of these doctrines? Is Schauer a modem-day Newton whose theories
about these doctrines, while seemingly correct, are, like Newton's theory of
gravity, simply misguided? Although Merrill does not apply his public goods
synthesis to the doctrines Schauer highlights, is it not possible to devise a
different approach to the Dormant Commerce Clause or state action or free
speech which, while not mentioned in any Supreme Court decision, neverthe-
less explains the outcomes of the cases? Merrill's attempt to unify through the
application of a public goods analysis certainly serves to suggest that a focus
on outcome rather than rationale can be useful.
Although Merrill ends his article with some suggestions about the weak-
nesses of a public goods approach, it is important to note that in making his
argument he focuses not on the articulated rationale behind government and
Court action within the doctrines he surveys, but rather on the outcomes, their
effects, and a possible, hitherto unarticulated rationale. Indeed, there is scarce-
ly a word quoted from the Supreme Court decisions he analyzes that suggests
a judicial concern about the external benefits of rights. If anything, the oppo-
site is true. Merrill's discussion of Dolan, for example, opens by quoting the
Court's statement that the focus of the Takings Clause is to protect individuals
from being required by government "to bear public burdens which ... should
be borne by the public as a whole." Since Dolan held the Takings Clause
right not to be waivable, a focus on the Court's language yields the conclusion
that a "public goods" notion is not a valid predictive principle in the area of
Takings Clause jurisprudence since the Clause exists to protect individuals.
Merrill goes on to show, however, that despite the Court's statement, there are
external benefits relating to the Takings Clause right that justify the Court's
holding. Other partially explanatory theories of unconstitutional conditions,
like coercion, operate in the same manner. Thus, it would seem that a unifying
87. Id. at 996-97.
88. Id. at 1002-03.
89. Id. at 997.
90. Merrill, supra note 6, at 880.
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or explanatory theory might well ignore the reasoning, and instead focus only
on the outcomes, of judicial decisions.
Now, with respect to the other observation about Schauer-that despite
his attempts to demonstrate chaos, he in fact is able to make some cogent
points about these cases as a group-chaos theory suggests there may be
deeper relationships between the cases than an analysis of the words written
by the justices in each opinion suggests. Schauer, despite his conclusion that
there is irregularity, and even randomness, in certain areas of constitutional
law, finds quite a few common elements in these irregularities. For example,
he observes that most areas of constitutional law decided by courts are really
only subsets of the full area of constitutional concern.9 Strangely, in addition
to an explanation of Kant's theory about lying which sounds in many ways
like Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty, the discovery of subsets that are
defined by what the Court can take on suggests some uniformity that cuts
across virtually all constitutional doctrines. This notion of uniformity is
strengthened by Schauer's many statements that constitutional theory is char-
acterized by "recurring" and "basic" tensions.92 Chaos theory suggests that
these uniformities may be evidence of deeper patterns that exist beneath the
thick layer of uncertainty that covers the surface. Complexity can ultimately be
explained in a simple manner. Chaos theorists would posit exactly the opposite
of Schauer's proposition that some problems may be intractable because of
"seemingly arbitrary lines" and "intrinsically competing policy objectives."'9
Schauer states that believing that a correct rule, principle or standard
exists for unconstitutional conditions requires "placing enormous faith in the
processes that have produced these problem-oriented groupings and head-
ings."94 This is exactly what chaos theory requires-a faith in the processes
that produce outcomes. But Schauer does not have that faith, and the reason he
does not is revealed later in his article when he states that the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine became "too hard" due to "pretheoretical intuitions (and
practical realities) about permissible actions."95 Schauer's implicit assumption
is that intuition belies uniformity.96 And yet, it could be argued that intuition
is precisely the process in which chaos theorists (and Albert Einstein) would
place enormous faith when applying rules of complexity to human reasoning.
In a fashion similar to Schauer's, Alexander points to case law surround-
ing the Dormant Commerce Clause, particularly Bacchus and West Lynn
Creamery, to show that a rational, predictable approach to taxes versus subsi-
dies cannot exist.97 But in doing so, he implicitly accepts the framing of the
question by the Supreme Court. Is it possible that some other tension, even
within the notion of protectionism, can better describe the different outcomes
91. Schauer, supra note 4, at 994 n.19.
92. Id. at 996.
93. Id. at 990.
94. Id. at 990 n.3.
95. Id. at 994.
96. Schauer is not the frst to suggest this. Intuitionism has been called counterfoundational.
See, e.g., Farber, supra note 3, at 1334.
97. Alexander, Impossible, supra note 5, at 1007-08.
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in those cases? The answer from Alexander may be no, but I would ask him
also to consider the way Merrill has approached his "public goods" notion of a
unifying theory. Although Merrill ignores the Dormant Commerce Clause, he
does use the public goods notion to explain case outcomes that were seeming-
ly irreconcilable, and he does so with an idea that cannot be taken from the
rationales used by the justices to explain their decisions.
Alexander suggests problems with other areas of constitutional law that
create barriers for a workable theory of unconstitutional conditions, including
the religion clauses, equal protection and free speech.98 He asserts that these
areas cannot be rationalized. When demonstrating why, however, he resorts to
the core ideas that have been used by the Court to anchor these doctrines. He
states, for example, that "neutrality" lies at the heart of the religion clauses
and free speech. 9 He does not, however, explore whether neutrality may
merely be a subset of a greater concern that might be gleaned from the out-
comes of the cases in these areas, but not highlighted expressly by the Court
in its decisions. Alexander does not address this possibility, and yet, he deems
a unifying principle "impossible." In fairness to Alexander, this essay does not
offer any unifying principle either. Thus, it does not very well serve to negate
his point. There are, however, other scholars who seem intent on showing
unification of First Amendment cases (religion and free speech) without rely-
ing on the statements of the Court in those cases."°
Alternatively, what if we assume that Alexander is correct-that the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause, for example, is a "constitutional oxymoron." None of
the earlier analogies to scientific ideas require us to assume that Supreme
Court constitutional jurisprudence has reached a perfect and harmonious end-
state. The anthropic principle, and Hawking's Darwinistic analysis of it, states
that we will evolve to a stage at which we will be able to explain outcomes
through application of a single theory. If that is true, then it is possible that
the Supreme Court may reverse itself with respect to its current Dormant
Commerce Clause decisions. The Court has certainly done this in the past.
One could argue, for example, that both Lochner v. New York and Plessy v.
Ferguson are good examples of decisions that were weeded out by the process
of natural selection as applied to judicial decisionmaking.
If we are not in the final, perfect end-state of constitutional jurisprudence,
then it may be "too hard" or "impossible" now to "discover" a unifying theory
of all constitutional law, and even of unconstitutional conditions. However, it
lends credence to the Darwinist view of constitutional jurisprudence that there
exist some partial unifying theories. In the area of unconstitutional conditions,
Alexander has written about a small number of proposed unifying theories that
he has proceeded to show hold no promise, at least in the current state of
98. Id. at 1008-09.
99. Id. at 1009.
100. Professor William Marshall, for example, is currently exploring whether the "search for
truth" may better serve to explain First Amendment decisions involving both religion and free
speech. See William Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justifica-
tion, 30 GA. L. REv. (forthcoming 1996).
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constitutional doctrine, as a single explanatory principle.' But, is it possible
that one of those theories may ultimately prevail as principles that are only
doctrinal pretenders fall by the wayside?
If it is possible that the Darwinist decisionmaking theory is true, then
consider the hazards of abandoning the search for a unifying theory of uncon-
stitutional conditions. Rather than exposing attempts at unifying theories to
criticism that would offer up a better strand of the theory, constitutional
scholars abandon the enterprise, resulting in the stagnation of constitutional
jurisprudence. Of course, if this were to occur I suppose one could simply say
that natural selection would have led to any prevailing system, meaning that it
is superior.
Nonetheless, shouldn't we encourage the growth and development of
constitutional jurisprudence? If the answer is yes, then shouldn't we encourage
the development of metanarratives that can be used to test individual doctrines.
If "public goods" can explain all case outcomes except those under the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause, then which is wrong? Is it Dormant Commerce
Clause decisionmaking to date or the "public goods" approach to constitutional
rights?
The development of law in the area of contracts serves as a good example
of this point. Contract law has evolved over time to yield the rules that now
dominate our system. Interestingly, those rules developed in the same haphaz-
ard way that many scholars, including Schauer and Alexander, have ascribed
to the development of constitutional law. However, in this century the devel-
opment of economics as a science, and specifically its application to contract
law, has shown that rules governing contracts tend to encourage efficien-
cy."° One major exception with respect to this is the American rule regard-
ing attorneys' fees. In the United States, a successful litigant who has been the
victim of a breach may not recover attorneys' fees and court costs even
though logic dictates that, in a system that provides no punitive damages,
recovery of these costs is critical to making the victim whole and encouraging
efficiency. Despite this exception to the notion of efficiency, the development
of these economics theories in contract law have been useful. Possibly also
they will be the vehicle by which the American rule regarding fees and costs
is reversed as an idea that cannot survive the further development of the law.
Alexander concludes his commentary by proposing that the Constitution is
not viewed as a list of fixed rules but as a source of heavily moralized princi-
ples." 3 He then questions the fit between morality and the discrete provi-
sions of the Constitution. 4 Alexander's position strongly implies the distinc-
tion between subjectivity and objectivity. If the Constitution is an objective
document, as it purports facially to be, then morality is incapable of linking
with it. Here, Alexander's argument resonates with Schauer's-rationality is
101. See Alexander, Optional Baselines, supra note 5.
102. See generally David W. Barnes, A Dozen Efficient Breaches (unpublished manuscript on
file with author).
103. Alexander, Impossible, supra note 5, at 1010.
104. Id.
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not an effective tool to describe what the Constitution has become through
case law. This kind of thinking about rationality at its core is analogous to
modernist, 19th century thinking about science that has been wiped away by
quantum mechanics and chaos theory in this century. To prove it wrong, how-
ever, one would have to show that there is something similar about human
reasoning and intuition that would produce case outcomes that are susceptible
to explanation by a common or unifying principle. If there is a uniformity or
rationality attributable to intuition, then Schauer and Alexander are wrong to
focus on the rationales rather than purely the outcomes of the cases they dis-
cuss.
It is beyond the scope of this essay to prove anything in any real sense,
but there are a few observations that can be made regarding a link between
rationality and intuition. The first is that the regime of constitutional jurispru-
dence has indeed evolved from a system of rules to a system of standards.
Many scholars have written about this phenomenon-Schauer and Alexander
among them. Rules have been generally lauded as rational, while standards
have been generally criticized as vague, and the decisionmaking process for
implementing standards has been challenged as requiring too much intuition.
And yet, the system of natural selection I have posited has generally yielded
up an increasingly standard-oriented scheme. This development seems similar
to the shift in metaphysics from the mechanistic world of Newton to the rela-
tivistic world of Einstein to the uncertain world of Heisenberg to the chaotic
world of Lorenz.
The second observation is that the shift from the certain to the uncertain is
not necessarily bad and not necessarily subjective. As Gerald Holton, discuss-
ing Einstein's essay on "preestablished harmony" has indicated, the key to
answering all questions of "science" lies in the synthesis of rationality and
intuition." 5 Einstein himself wrote in 1918 that from general laws "it should
be possible to obtain by pure deduction the description, that is to say the theo-
ry, of every natural process, including those of life."'" Einstein continued by
saying that "the journey toward that goal will be neither fast nor direct" be-
cause "to the [grand] elemental laws there leads no logical path, but only intu-
ition." °0 If Holton and Einstein are correct, constitutional scholars should
spend less time criticizing the current chaos in constitutional jurisprudence
while pining away for past certainty and more time attempting to understand
the rationalities that underpin the chaotic veneer of current constitutional doc-
trines. The best way to do this, it seems to me, is to pursue unifying theories.
105. See Holton, supra note 72.
106. Id. (citing Albert Einstein, PRINCIPLES OF RESEARCH (1918)).
107. Id.
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